Just before Christmas I tabled three important Parliamentary Questions to the Home Secretary. A mealy-mouthed response to one of them has now arrived. I asked "what level of security clearance is required for IT specialists employed on temporary visas by IBM (India) who work in Somerset with access to private information about staff of Avon and Somerset Police." The Minister said I should direct my question to the Chief Constable!

This is Ministerial dereliction of duty. The Home Office is responsible for what Police forces do - especially if they do it wrong. I believe there is now a significant security risk to the lives of individual police officers and, potentially, to the safety of the state caused by lax vetting procedures for Indian IBM staff working in Somerset. I believe that Avon and Somerset Police is (or ought to be) well aware of the risk, but but has done little or nothing to minimise it.

WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON IN BLOCK B?

Just around the corner from the main entrance to Taunton's County Hall lies Block B, the nerve centre of the building. This is where much of the computer equipment for all South West One's partners is based. At the outset the Police were concerned about the security of their own Human Resource files. Police HR files contain names addresses and - in the case of specialist undercover and anti-terrorism officers - aliases and other sensitive contacts. The Police insisted that a special secure area be constructed inside Block B to which only Police personnel would be admitted.

That secure area was built. Access can be obtained only via an electronic swipe card. Council staff (even those with the highest security clearances)were and remain excluded.

Avon and Somerset Police say they take data protection very seriously. This document - from a conference of data protection officers organised by the Government in 2008 - shows Avon and Somerset's avowed policies (see P 12)

Anyone from this country seeking to work for Avon and Somerset Police has to undergo an extremely thorough vetting process.

But when SAP started to go wrong, someone started cutting corners. IBM began to fly in their own IT specialists. At one stage there were almost 100 foreign nationals living and working in Taunton on temporary visas. Not one of them has undergone full security vetting. But all of them have been given swipe-card access to the secure area in Block B where sensitive Police HR  files are held.

As I write there are still at least ten individuals, Indian nationals, trying to fix South West One's wildly inefficient SAP installation. SAP is the system designated by IBM. The IT experts were flown in from IBM's main base in Bangalore where SAP system now used by the Police, Somerset County Council and Taunton Deane council was originally configured. It is no accident that IBM has such a large presence in India. By comparison with the West, India is cheap. Labour costs are much lower.

The role of the Chief Constable in this matter is confusing. For Mr Colin Port is not only in charge of his force, he is also on the board of South West One  - a company from which his force "buys" many services. Some see that as a clear conflict of interest.

In the light of the Minister's pathetic response to my question I will now be seeking a full Parliamentary debate about the security of Police HR files and the role of the Chief Constable. Meantime if you have any additional information please contact me in confidence:

[email protected]